Unfiltered Smoke

by Mary Andow

My previous essay entitled “What’s in a thought?” has received criticism from a writer so I thought I would take a few moments to respond. When I first sat down to write my response I did a paragraph by paragraph ‘rebuttal of the rebuttal’ so to speak. Upon having my draft reviewed however, it came to my attention that I had done the exact same review of Matthew Flanagan’s piece that he had done of mine. Besides being far too long, I had failed to offer the reader a solid thesis statement or logical conclusion. I believe Flanagan’s criticism of my piece does the same; in absence of a thesis to suggest otherwise, I believe Flanagan has accidentally written a piece that supports my statements rather than refuting them.

What I understand to be one of Flanagan’s major issues with my statements is that they lack moral grounding. I did, however, ask my reader to put morality aside since I believe it has no place in this argument. That is not to say that I am anti-morals; it is actually quite the opposite. If I had written the piece to offer a personal opinion, it would be much more closely aligned with Flanagan’s rebuttal than the piece I actually wrote. My personal moralistic values are irrelevant in this discussion, however, which is where I dispute Flanagan.

An example of where I believe Flanagan did more to further my point than refute it arises during his discussion of accidental morality. Flanagan offers an example of this condition when he discusses a person firing a gun into a crowd and accidentally killing a serial rapist – a very immoral act. This and other examples are thought provoking but the bottom line still relates to illegal activity, not morals – present, absent, or otherwise. Would it matter if the shooter had sought out the serial rapist in an attempt to protect the public? No, since he will be going to prison for murder either way. Bottom line, it is the action that is punishable, not the thought.

Furthering my point, Flanagan addresses my biggest failure, which was an incoherent attempt to unlink action from thought. It is true that there is no action without thought; I would never dispute this. I have to stand my ground, however, and conclude (once again) that a person’s motivation should have no place in our criminal system. Flanagan raises a good idea when he states that both bias and intent live in our thoughts. This and the coinciding example again miss (yet further) my point. Whether your house burns because you are forgetful or whether it burns because you are an arsonist does not negate the fact that your house is, indeed, a pile of ashes.

Moving on, Flanagan’s point that to ‘censor,’ to ‘influence,’ and to ‘regulate’ are drastically different concepts is an excellent one. The last two seem especially vital to differentiate. Influence: “the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command.”1 Regulate: “to govern or direct according to rule” or “to bring under the control of law or constituted authority.”2 While I am perfectly okay with the idea that education, advertising and the arts influence me, I think I would protest if they could somehow regulate me. In the same turn, I am opposed to hate crime ‘regulations.’ While Flanagan is correct that ‘censorship’ was a poor word choice, I am not any happier with the outcome when he changes the word to ‘regulate.’

Flanagan’s final statement that I reject hate crime legislation because it censors (or ‘regulates’) a person’s thoughts by ‘telling them who to hate and who not to’ could not be further from the truth. Somehow my point was lost on at least one reader. All together now: “Mary rejects hate crime legislation because the motivation does not change the end outcome.” As for the extreme yet logical conclusion that my article suggested pedophiles should be free to prey on children, I think what Flanagan meant to ask was “Why are you supporting this Nazi policy” of healthcare reform? My response would, of course, be much more polite than Barney Frank.

Despite offering a series of ideas that refuted my paper point by point, I was unable to find Flanagan’s, well, point. My point is that with all of his theoretical examples, he helped to further my agenda which was that, in a discussion of the legal system, both morals and motivation are irrelevant. These are just my thoughts: sacred to me, but hopefully very (unimportant) to you – especially if you are a judge.

(editor’s note: To avoid a potentially endless back and forth, Mary has decided that any further discourse on the subject from her side will likely do so through the comments section.)